資料紹介
Competitive Enterprise Institute
1001 Connecticut Ave NW • Suite 1250 • Washington, DC 20036
202.331.1010 • www.cei.org
Advancing Liberty – From the Economy to Ecology
January 8, 2008 No. 129
The Subprime Crisis in Historical Perspective
By Eli Lehrer and Matthew Glans
*
In recent weeks, it has become difficult to avoid news media warnings of economic calamity
stemming from the subprime housing market collapse. For example, The Wall Street Journal
recently warned that the subprime crisi
資料の原本内容
C o m pet it ive E n t e rp ris e Ins t itut e
1 001 C on ne ct ic ut A ve NW • Su it e 12 50 • Wa sh ingt on , DC 200 36
2 02 .3 31 .1 01 0 • w w w .c e i .o rg
Advancing Liberty – From the Economy to Ecology
January 8, 2008
No. 129
The Subprime Crisis in Historical Perspective
By Eli Lehrer and Matthew Glans*
In recent weeks, it has become difficult to avoid news media warnings of economic calamity
stemming from the subprime housing market collapse. For example, The Wall Street Journal
recently warned that the subprime crisis could rival the fallout from Savings and Loan (S&L)
meltdown in the 1990s and the bursting of the tech stock bubble in the early 2000s.1 ABC News
has suggested that the proposed government actions to deal with the crisis do not go nearly far
enough.2 Business Week has criticized the low number of borrowers being helped by the Bush
administration’s back bailout plan.3 And New York Daily News columnist Errol Louis warns that
the crisis could become “the country’s most serious economic challenge since the Great
Depression.”4
Analyzed relative to the economy as a whole, however, the current subprime crisis appears likely
to have a significantly smaller overall impact than the S&L crisis or the housing foreclosures that
took place during the Great Depression. This essay outlines the dimensions of the subprime crisis
and provides historically adjusted comparisons to both the S&L crisis of the 1980s and the
housing collapse of the Great Depression during the 1930s.
Analyzed in isolation, economic statistics mean little. The United States, for example, has more
unemployed citizens than does France, even though France has an unemployment rate about
twice as high as America’s.5 Raw numbers mean almost nothing: To measure the economic
impact of financial events, it is important to look at them in context.
Measuring Impact. There are several approaches to measuring the impact of the subprime
crisis. Congress’s Joint Economic Committee (JEC) estimates $100 billion in direct losses—that
is, losses stemming directly from loans going bad—to homeowners as a result of subprime
crisis.6 The JEC estimates that housing values will decline by $2.3 trillion, while the U.S.
*
Eli Lehrer is a Senior Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute and Matthew Glans is a Legislative Specialist
at the Heartland Institute.
Conference of Mayors estimates a $1.2 trillion decline.7 The number of foreclosures appears
likely to rise, from roughly 1.2 million in 2006, to about 1.5 million in 2007.8
While housing value declines in the trillions appear enormous, two factors suggest that they are
less significant than they first appear.
First, home price values may not actually have collapsed on nearly as large a scale as the JEC
claims. Although its methodology differs from the JEC—making an exact comparison of the two
numbers impossible—it’s instructive that the Conference of Mayors also projects a lower
number. As Anthony Downs of the Brookings Institution argues quite convincingly in a recent
paper, home prices simply are not declining everywhere. Among his well taken points:
Default rates are rising on subprime mortgages, but these mortgages—which offer loans
to borrowers with poor credit at higher interest rates—form a relatively small part of all
mortgage originations.
He continues:
Unless the U.S. economy dips dramatically, however, the vast majority of subprime
mortgages will be paid. And, because there is no basic shortage of money, investors still
have a tremendous amount of financial capital they must put to work somewhere.9
Second, the collapse may not prove calamitous because people do not purchase homes primarily
as investment vehicles. A share of stock that declines 20 percent loses 20 percent of its utility,
while a house that declines in value by 20 percent remains just as useful to live in. Many people
do borrow against their houses for business purposes, but since few lenders will let borrowers
take out loans for 10...
